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Densely Entangled Financial Systems
Bhaskar DasGupta and Lakshmi Kaligounder
Abstract In [1] Zawadoski introduces a banking network model in which the asset
and counter-party risks are treated separately and the banks hedge their assets risks
by appropriate OTC contracts. In his model, each bank has only two counter-party
neighbors, a bank fails due to the counter-party risk only if at least one of its two
neighbors default, and such a counter-party risk is a low probability event. Infor-
mally, the author shows that the banks will hedge their asset risks by appropriate
OTC contracts, and, though it may be socially optimal to insure against counter-
party risk, in equilibrium banks will not choose to insure this low probability event.
In this paper, we consider the above model for more general network topologies,
namely when each node has exactly 2r counter-party neighbors for some integer
r > 0. We extend the analysis of [1] to show that as the number of counter-party
neighbors increase the probability of counter-party risk also increases, and in par-
ticular the socially optimal solution becomes privately sustainable when each bank
hedges its risk to at least n/2 banks, where n is the number of banks in the network,
i.e., when 2r is at least n/2, banks not only hedge their asset risk but also hedge its
counter-party risk.
1 Introduction
Economic stability has received special attention during the past several years
mainly because of the economic downturn experienced globally in the recent past.
This attention has generated renewed interest in evaluating how important the eco-
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nomic stability is as having an unstable economy can pave way to an economic crisis
each time when the global markets sees a downward trend. Financial instability and
its effects on the economy can be very costly due to its contagion or spillover ef-
fects to other parts of the economy and it is fundamental to have a sound, stable and
healthy financial system to support the efficient allocation of resources and distribu-
tion of risks across the economy. Financial risk management is a critical component
of maintaining economic stability. Hedging is a risk management option that pro-
tects the owner of an asset from loss. It is the process of shifting risks to the futures
market. The risks in the market must be first identified in order to manage the risk.
To identify the risk one must examine both the immediate risk (asset risk) as well as
the risk due to indirect effects (counter-party risk). Though hedging will minimize
overall profit when markets are moving positive, it also helps in reducing risk during
undesirable market conditions. However, as the owner hedges his/her asset risk to
protect against defaults, the owner also gets exposed to the counter-party risk.
In [1] Zawadoski introduces a banking network model in which the asset and
counter-party risks are treated separately, and showed that, under certain situations,
banks do not manage counter-party risk in equilibrium. In his model, each bank has
only two counter-party neighbors, a bank fails due to the counter-party risk only if
at least one of its two neighbors default, and such a counter-party risk is an event
with low probability. Informally, the author shows that the banks will hedge their
asset risks by appropriate OTC contracts, and, though it may be socially optimal
for banks to insure against counter-party risk, in equilibrium banks will not choose
to insure this low probability event. The OTC contract not only creates a contagion
but also creates externalities which undermines the incentives of the banks to avert
contagion. The model uses short term debt to finance their real asset. The failure in
this model is from the liability side, where the investors run on the banks when they
do not trust the bank, i.e., the investors do not roll over the debts of the banks. Hence
the contagion can be avoided only by increasing the equity and not by providing
liquidity.
In this paper, we consider the above model for more general network topologies,
namely when each node has exactly 2r counter-party neighbors for some integer
r > 0. We extend the analysis of [1] to show that as the number of counter-party
neighbors increase the probability of counter-party risk also increases1, and in par-
ticular, the socially optimal solution becomes privately sustainable when each bank
hedges its risk to a sufficiently large number of other banks. The counter-party risk
can be hedged by holding more equity, buying default insurance on their counter-
parties or collateralizing OTC contracts. Since holding excess capital or collateral-
izing OTC contracts is a wasteful use of scarce capital [1], when the banks choose
to hedge their counter-party risk they buy the default insurance on their counter-
parties. More precisely, our conclusions for the general case of 2r neighbors are as
follows:
• All the banks will still decide to hedge their asset risks.
1 Thus, the owners will decide to hedge their counter-party risk thereby helping to contain an
economic crisis.
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• If the number of counter-party neighbors is at least n/2, then all banks will de-
cide to insure their counter-parties, and socially optimal solution in case of two
counter-parties for each bank now becomes privately optimal solution.
• In the limit when the number of banks n in the network tend to ∞, as the number
of counter-party neighbors approach n−1, failure of very few of its counter-party
banks will not affect a bank.
2 Related Prior Research Works
As we have already mentioned, Zawadowski [1] introduced a banking model in
which asset risk and counter-party risk are treated separately, showed that banks
always prefer to hedge their asset risk using OTC contracts and also showed that
banks do not hedge their counter-party risk even though hedging counter-party risk
is possible and socially desirable. Allen and Gale [23] showed that interbank de-
posits help banks share liquidity risk but expose them to asset losses if their counter-
party defaults. Their model cannot be used to understand the contractual choices in
case of OTC derivatives as they modeled the liquidity risk. Babus [18] proposed
a model in which links are formed between banks which serves as an insurance
mechanism to reduce the risk of contagion. Allen and Babus [12] pointed out that
graph-theoretic concepts provide a conceptual framework used to describe and ana-
lyze the banking network, and showed that more interbank links provide banks with
a form of coinsurance against uncertain liquidity flows. Gai and Kapadi [5] showed
that more interbank links increase the opportunity for spreading failures to other
banks during crisis. Several prior researchers such as [11, 12, 17, 21] commented
that graph-theoretic frameworks may provide a powerful tool for analyzing stability
of banking and other financial networks. Kleindorfer et al. [11] argued that network
analyses can play a crucial role in understanding many important phenomena in fi-
nance. Freixas et al. [24] explored the case of banks that face liquidity fluctuations
due to the uncertainty about consumers withdrawing funds. Iazzetta and Manna [13]
analysed the monthly data on deposit exchange to understand the spread of liquidity
crisis using network topology.
Babus [20] studied how the trade-off between the benefits and the costs of be-
ing linked changes depending on the network structure and observed that, when the
network is maximal, liquidity can be redistributed in the system to make the risk of
contagion minimal. Corbo and Demange [6] explored the relationship of the struc-
ture of interbank connections to the contagion risk of defaults given the exogenous
default of set of banks. Nier et al. [17] explored the dependency of systemic risks
on the structure of the banking system via network theoretic approach and the re-
silience of such a system to contagious defaults. Haldane [13] suggested that conta-
gion should be measured based on the interconnectedness of each institution within
the financial system. Liedorp et al. [8] investigated if interconnectedness in the in-
terbank market is a channel through which banks affect each others riskiness, and
argued that both large lending and borrowing shares in interbank markets increase
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the riskiness of banks active in the dutch banking market. Kiyotaki and Moore [26]
studied the chain reaction caused by the shock in one firm and the financial diffi-
culties in other firms due to this chain reaction. Acharya and Bisin [14] compared
centralized markets to OTC markets and showed that counter-party risk externali-
ties can lead to excessive default and production of aggregate risk. Caballero and
Simsek [16] concluded that OTC derivatives are not the sole reason for the ineffi-
ciency of financial networks. Pirrong [15] argued that central counter-parties (CCP)
can also increase the systemic risk under certain circumstances and hence the in-
troduction of CCP will not guarantee to mitigate the systemic risk. Zawadowski [7]
showed that complicated interwoven financial intermediation can be a reason for
inefficient financial networks, and hence OTC are not the only reason for financial
instability. Stulz [9] showed that exchange trading has both benefits and costs com-
pared to OTC trading, and argued that credit default swaps (CDS) did not cause
the crisis since they worked well during much of the first year of the crisis. Zhu
and Pykhtin [19] showed that modeling credit exposures is vital for risk manage-
ment application, while modelling credit value adjustment (CVA) is necessary step
for pricing and hedging counter-party credit risk. Corbo and Demange [6] showed
that introduction of central clearing house for credit default swaps will mitigate the
counter-party risk. Gandhi et al. [4] paralleled and complemented the conclusion
of [6], i.e., the creation of central clearing house for CDS contracts may not reduce
the counter-party risk.
3 The basic model
The model has n > 3 banks and three time periods t = 0,1,2 termed as initial, interim
and final, respectively. Each bank has exactly 2r counter-party neighbors for some
integer r > 0 (see Fig. 1 for an illustration). The unit investment of each bank in
the long term real asset yields a return of R+
| i−r |∑
k= | i−1 |
εk −
| i−2r |∑
k= | i−(r+1) |
εk at t = 2, where R =
{
RH , if the project succeeds
RL < RH , if the project fails , and each εk is realized at t = 2 taking values of u
or −u each with probability 1/2. For each unit investment made by the bank at t = 0,
the investor lends D ≥ 0 as short term debt and equity 1−D ≥ 0 is the bank’s share.
The short term debt has to be rolled over at time period t = 1 for the banks to operate
successfully. Thus the debt holders have an option to withdraw funding and force
the bank to liquidate the real project.
Let e ∈ {0,1} be the unobservable effort choice such that a bank needs to exert
an effort of e = 1 at both time period t = 0 and t = 1 for the project to be successful
(i.e., R = RH). At t = 1 the project can be in one of the two states: a “bad” state
with probability p or a “good” state with probability 1− p, irrespective of the effort
exerted by the bank. At a “bad” state the project of one of the randomly chosen bank
fails and delivers RL, even if e = 1 at both time periods t = 0 and t = 1. Unless the
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˜b0
˜b1
˜b2
˜b3
˜b4
˜b5
˜b6
˜b7
˜b8
˜b9
˜b10
˜b11
˜b12
˜b13
˜b14
˜b15
Fig. 1 An illustration of a network of 16 banks ˜b0, ˜b1, . . . , ˜b15 with r = 3. Each ˜bi is connected to
the banks ˜b i−3 (mod 16), ˜b i−2 (mod 16), ˜b i−1 (mod 16), ˜b i+1 (mod 16), ˜b i+2 (mod 16) and ˜b i+3 (mod 16).
bank demand collateral from its counter-parties, if the bank defaults at t = 1 then all
the hedging liabilities of the defaulted bank gets cancelled, the investors liquidate
the bank and take equal share of L (the value of the bank when it is liquidated). If
the bank survives till t = 2 and the counter-party risk gets realized then, the bank has
to settle the counter-party hedging contract before paying its debt.
We use the following notations for four specific values of the probability of bad
state p:
psoc: if p < psoc, then irrespective of the number of counter-party neighbors there
is no need for counter-party insurance even from social perspective.
pind: if p > pind then the banks will not buy counter-party insurance as the private
benefits of insuring exceeds the cost.
pterm: if p < pterm then the banks will continue to prefer short term debt.
paut: if p < paut then no bank will have an incentive to hold more equity and bor-
row less.
Parameter Restrictions and Assumptions
The following parameter restriction are adopted from [1] to make them consistent
for a network model with 2r counter-parties. B is the banks’ private benefit with the
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subscript representing the specific time period and X denotes the additional non-
pledgable payoff. Inequality (1) ensures that the investors will choose to roll over
the debt at t = 1 when the project is expected to succeed (i.e., R = RH), and the
investors will decide to liquidate the bank at t = 1 if the bank’s project is expected
to fail (i.e., R = RL). Inequality (2) implies that it is socially optimal to exert effort.
Inequality (3) ensures that banks have to keep positive equity to overcome moral
hazard. Inequality (4) ensures that, counter-party risk of the bank is large enough
to lead to contagion but small enough that the bank does not want to engage in
risk-shifting.
RL < L <
(
1− p
n
) (
RH +X
)
−B1 (1)
RH −RL >
2B1
1− p
n
(2)
B1 ≥ RH −1+X (3)
B1−X < u <
B1
22r −
r∑
K=0
2r!
K!
(
2r−K
)
!

2r
r∑
K=0
2r−2K
K!
(
2r−K
)
!
(4)
β > 1/2 and β >
1−
(
1− p
)(
RH +X−B1
)
− p L(
1− p
)
B1
(5)
2u ≤ B0 <
(
1− p
)
B1 (6)
4 Our Results
Our results imply that when the number of counter-party neighbors is at least n/2,
the socially optimal outcome become privately sustainable.
Theorem 1. If the probability of bad state is p ∈ [0, p⋆), where p⋆ =min{pind, paut, pterm}
then the followings hold.
(a) Banks endogenously enter into OTC contracts as shown by Zawadowski in [1].
(b) Banks borrow D < 1 for short term at t = 0 at an interest rate Rı,0 > 1 and Rı,1 = 1
as shown by Zawadowski in [1].
(c) In a bad state, failure of a single bank leads to run on all banks in the system
only when 2r < n/2.
(d) If a bank loses at least r counter-parties, it needs a debt reduction of I = ru−
B1+X > 0.
(e) The contagious equilibrium stated by Zawadowski in [1] exist only if 2r < n/2.
When 2r ≥ n/2 banks insure against counter-party risk using default insurance.
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(f) If p ∈
(
psoc, pind
)
then the socially optimal outcome is sustainable in equilibrium.
Theorem 1(a) is proved in Lemma 5, whereas Theorem 1(c),(e),(f) are showed
in Lemma 6. Theorem 1(d) follows from the derivations of parameter values as de-
scribed in Section 4.1; these derivations follow from the work in [1] and are provided
in the appendix. Theorem 1(b) uses the same proof as that in [1] and is therefore
omitted.
4.1 Proofs of Theorem 1
The derivations of the parameters and their values described in items (I) – (VIII)
below follow from the work in [1] since they are not affected by changing the num-
ber of counter-party neighbors from 2 to 2r. For the sake of completeness, these
derivations are provided in the appendix.
(I) The maximum amount of borrowing at t = 0 that can be roll over at t = 1 is
given by:
Dmax
(
Rı,0
)
=
RH −B1+X
Rı,0
< 1
and the expected payoff of the above bank borrowing Dmax is B1.
(II) In a stable system where all banks buy counter-party insurance, the price per
unit of default insurance is
ssafe =
1−β
n
−β
p
n
(where the superscript “safe” denotes the insured system).
(III) In a stable system where all banks buy counter-party insurance, the amount
borrowed by the bank for unit investment in the project is
Dsafe =
(
1− p
n
) (
RH −B1+X
)
+
p
n
L
(IV) In a contagious system where banks decide not to buy insurance, the amount
borrowed by the bank for unit investment in the project is
D⋆ =
(
1− p
)(
RH −B1+X
)
+ p L
(V) In a contagious system where banks decide not to buy insurance, the interest
rate for the amount borrowed is
R⋆ı,0 =
1
1− p
(
1− L
RH −B1+X
)
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(VI) pterm = (1−β) ( n
n−1
) 
B0
RH +X− L−B1
(1−β)+ RL+βB1− L
n−1
.
(VII) pf.aut =
(
1−β
)(
RH +X−B1−RL
)
RH +X− L−B1
(
1−β
)
−
β
n
(
RH −RL
) .
(VIII) paut =min
{
ps.aut, pr.aut, pf.aut
}
, where the superscripts s.aut, r.aut and f.aut stand for
safe autarky, risky autarky and full autarky, respectively.
Lemma 1. pind =
I
(
1−β
)
βB1
(Informally, Lemma 1 states that the probability of bad state must be at least pind =
I
(
1−β
)
βB1
for a bank’s benefit to outweigh the cost of its counter-party insurance).
Proof. The private incentive of a single bank to stay insured instead of deviating
from counter-party insurance is when the following holds (in the left-hand side of
the inequality, the first term is the payoff if no bank defaults, the second term is
the payoff if any of the counter-parties of the bank default, the third term is money
invested to buy the insurance on the bank’s counter-parties and the fourth term is the
bank’s equity):
benefits from all banks being insured ≥ benefits from all but one bank not being insured
≡ β
(
1−
(
1+2r
)
p
n
)
B1+β
2rp
n
(
B1+ I
)
− ssafe
(
2rI
)
−
(
1−Dsafe
)
≥ β
(
1− (1+2r).p
n
)
B1−
(
1−Dsafe
)
≡ β
2rp
n
(
B1+ I
)
− ssafe
(
2rI
)
≥ 0 ≡ β 2rp
n
(
B1+ I
)
−
(
1−β
n
+β
p
n
) (
2rI
)
≥ 0
≡
2βrpB1
n
+
2βrpI
n
−
2rI
n
+
2rβI
n
−
2βrpI
n
≥ 0 ≡ βrpB1− rI+ rβI ≥ 0
≡ βrpB1 ≥ rI − rβI ≡ βpB1 ≥ I −βI ≡ p ≥
I
(
1−β
)
βB1
=⇒ pind =
I
(
1−β
)
βB1
⊓⊔
Lemma 2. psoc =
2Ir (1−β)(
n−1
)(
RH +X− L−B1
(
1−β
)) .
(Informally, Lemma 2 states that the probability of bad state must be at most psoc =
2Ir (1−β)
(n−1) (RH+X−L−B1(1−β)) for the social benefits to outweigh the social cost of its counter-
party insurance).
Proof. The social benefits outweigh the social cost of the counter-party insurance
of the system if and only if the following holds:
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benefits from all banks being insured ≥ benefits from no bank being insured
≡ β
(
1−
(
1+2r
)
p
n
B1+β
2rp
n
B1+ I
)
− ssafe
(
2rI
)
−
(
1−Dsafe
)
≥ β
(
1− p
)
B1−
(
1−D⋆
)
≡ βB1−
βB1 p
n
−
2βB1 pr
n
+
2βB1pr
n
+
2βIpr
n
−
(
1−β
n
+
β p
n
) (
2rI
)
−1+
(
1− p
n
) (
RH +X−B1
)
+
p L
n
≥ βB1
(
1− p
)
−1+
(
1− p
) (RH +X−B1)+ p L
≡ βB1−
βB1 p
n
+
2βIpr
n
−
2rI
n
+
2βrI
n
−
2βIpr
n
−1+RH +X−B1− pRHn −
pX
n
+
pB1
n
+
p L
n
≥ βB1− pβB1−1+RH +X−B1− pRH − pX+ pB1+ p L
≡ −
βB1 p
n
−
2rI
n
+
2βr I
n
−
pRH
n
−
p X
n
+
p B1
n
+
p L
n
≥ −pβB1− pRH − p X+ p B1+ p L
≡ −
βB1 p
n
−
pRH
n
−
p X
n
+
p B1
n
+
p L
n
+ pβB1+ pRH + p X− p B1− p L ≥
2RI
n
−
2βRI
n
≡ p
(
−βB1−RH −X+B1+ L−nβB1+nRH +nX−nB1−nL
)
≥ 2Ir
(
1−β
)
≡ p
(
βB1(n−1)+RH(n−1)+X(n−1)−B1(n−1)− L(n−1)) ≥ 2Ir (1−β)
≡ p ≥
2Ir
(
1−β
)
(
n−1
)(
βB1+RH +X−B1− L
) ≡ p ≥ 2Ir
(
1−β
)
(
n−1
)(
RH +X− L−B1(1−β) )
and thus psoc =
2Ir
(
1−β
)
(
n−1
)(
RH +X− L−B1(1−β) ) . ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. If each bank has only two counter-parties then r = 1 and thus psoc =
2I(1−β)(
n−1
)(
RH +X− L−B1(1−β) ) .
Lemma 3 (Probability of failure in risky autarky).
pr.aut = (1−β) n
n−1
X
1− 2r!
22r
r∑
K=0
1
K! (2r−K)!
RH +X− L−B1(1−β)− (nβ−1)X
n−1
1− 2r!22r
r∑
K=0
1
K! (2r−K)!

(An informal explanation of Lemma 3 is as follows. If a bank has enough eq-
uity to survive even if all of its counter-parties collapse then the bank may be
forced to borrow less and this is not profitable. But, if the bank decides to devi-
ate to risky autarky then it cannot pay back its debt if the real project delivers
RH − 2ru. The probability of failure if the bank chooses risky autarky is given by
pr.aut = (1−β) n
n−1 X
1− 2r!
22r
∑r
K=0
1
K! (2r−K)!
RH+X−L−B1(1−β)− (nβ−1)Xn−1
(
1− 2r!
22r
∑r
K=0
1
K! (2r−K)!
) ).
Proof. For a bank to be in risky autarky, they borrow less such that it can roll over
the debt at t = 1 if its neighbors collapse but need not survive at t = 2. The relevant
incentive constraint is:
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RH +
2r! X
22r
r∑
K=0
1
K! (2r−K)! −R
r.aut
ı,0 D
r.aut ≥ B1
≡ Rr.autı,0 D
r.aut ≤ RH −B1+
2r! X
22r
r∑
K=0
1
K! (2r−K)!
The break-even condition for investors at t = 0 is:
Dr.aut =
p
n
L+
(
1− p
n
)
Rr.autı,0 D
r.aut
≡ Dr.aut =
p
n
L+RH −B1−
p
n
RH +
p
n
B1+
(
1− p
n
) 2r! X
22r
r∑
K=0
1
K! (2r−K)!
A bank decides not to deviate to risky autarky in a contagious system if and only if
the following holds:
payoff in contagious system ≥ payoff in risky autarky
≡ β (1− p)B1− (1−D⋆) ≥ β (1− p) (RH +X−R r.autı,0 D r.aut)+β n−1n p B1−
(
1−Dr.aut
)
≡ βB1− pβB1−1+RH +X−B1− pRH − p X+ p B1
≥
(
β− pβ
) (
RH +X−RH +B1−
2r! X
22r
∑r
K=0
1
K! (2r−K)!
)
+β
n−1
n
p B1−1+
p
n
L
+RH −B1−
p
n
RH +
p
n
B1+
(
1− p
n
) 2r! X
22r
∑r
K=0
1
K! (2r−K)!
≡
n
n−1
(1−β)X
(
1− 2r!
22r
∑r
K=0
1
K! (2r−K)!
)
≥ p
[
RH +X− L−B1(1−β)− (nβ−1)X
n−1
(
1− 2r!
22r
∑r
K=0
1
K! (2r−K)!
) ]
which implies
pr.aut = (1−β) n
n−1
X
1−
2r!
22r
r∑
K=0
1
K! (2r−K)!
RH +X− L−B1(1−β)− (nβ−1)X
n−1
1− 2r!22r
r∑
K=0
1
K! (2r−K)!

⊓⊔
Corollary 2. If the number of neighbors is 2 then r = 1 and thus
pr.aut = (1−β) n
n−1
X
1− 2
4
(
1
2
+
1
1
)
RH +X− L−B1(1−β)− nβ−1
n−1
X
(
1− 2
4
(
1
2
+
1
1
))
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≡ pr.aut = (1−β) n
n−1
X
1− 3
4
RH +X− L−B1(1−β)− nβ−1
n−1
X
(
1− 34
)
≡ pr.aut = (1−β) n
n−1
X
4
RH +X− L−B1(1−β)−
(
nβ−1
n−1
) (X
4
)
Lemma 4 (Probability of failure in safe autarky).
ps.aut = (1−β)
(
n
n−1
) 2ru+X−B1
RH +X− L−B1+βB1+
1−β
n−1
(
X+2ru−B1
)
(An informal explanation of Lemma 4 is as follows. If a bank chooses to deviate to
safe autarky, it will survive unless it is directly affected by low return RL. It can pay
back its debt even if the real project delivers RH−2ru. The probability of failure if the
bank chooses safe autarky is given by ps.aut = (1−β)
(
n
n−1
)
2ru+X−B1
RH+X−L−B1+βB1+
1−β
n−1
(
X+2ru−B1
) ).
Proof. Suppose that a bank survives at t = 2 even if all of its counter-party risks
are realized to ensure that the payoff of the real project is RH −2ru. Since the bank
needs enough equity to survive even if real project yields RH −2ru, we have
RH −2ru−Rs.autı,0 D
s.aut ≥ 0 ≡ Rs.autı,0 D
s.aut ≤ RH −2ru
The break-even condition for investors at t = 0 is:
Ds.aut =
(
1− p
n
)
Rs.autı,0 D
s.aut+
p
n
L ≡ Ds.aut =
(
1− p
n
) (
RH −2ru
)
+
p
n
L
Banks do not deviate to safe autarky from contagious system if and only if the
following holds:
payoff in contagious system ≥ payoff in safe autarky
≡ β
(
1− p
)
B1−
(
1−D⋆
)
≥ β
(
1− p
n
) (
RH +X−Rs.autı,0 D
s.aut
)
−
(
1−Ds.aut
)
≡ βB1− pβB1−1+RH +X−B1− pRH − p X+ p B1+ p L
≥
(
β−
pβ
n
) (
RH +X−RH +2ru
)
−1+RH −2ru−
p
n
RH +
p
n
(
2ru
)
+
p
n
L
≡ βB1− pβB1+X−B1− pRH − p X+ p B1+ p L
≥ βRH +βX−βRH +2βru−
pβRH
n
−
pβX
n
+
pβRH
n
−
2pβru
n
−2ru− p
n
RH +
p
n
(
2ru
)
+
p
n
L
≡ βB1+X−B1−βX−2βru+2ru ≥
p
n
(
nβB1+nRH +nX−nB1−nL−βX−2rβu−RH +2ru+ L
)
≡ (1−β)X− (1−β)B1+2ru(1−β)
12 Bhaskar DasGupta and Lakshmi Kaligounder
≥
p
n
(
nβB1+RH(n−1)+nX−nB1− L(n−1)−βX+2ru(1−β)+X−X+B1−B1+βB1−βB1
)
≡ (1−β)n (2ru+X−B1)
≥ p
(
βB1(n−1)+RH(n−1)+X(n−1)−B1(n−1)− L(n−1)+X(1−β)+2ru(1−β)−B1(1−β)
)
≡ (1−β) n
n−1
(2Ru+X−B1) ≥ p
(
βB1+RH +X−B1− L+
1−β
n−1
(X+2ru−B1)
)
≡ p ≤ (1−β)
(
n
n−1
) 2ru+X−B1
RH +X− L−B1+βB1+
1−β
n−1
(
X+2ru−B1
)
This implies ps.aut = (1−β)
(
n
n−1
) 2ru+X−B1
RH +X− L−B1+βB1+
1−β
n−1
(
X+2ru−B1
) .
⊓⊔
Corollary 3. If the number of neighbors is 2 then r = 1 and thus
ps.aut =
(
1−β
) ( n
n−1
) 2u+X−B1
RH +X− L−B1+βB1+
1−β
n−1
(
X+2u−B1
)
Lemma 5. In equilibrium banks hedge all of its counter-party risks i.e. banks en-
dogenously enter into OTC contracts.
Proof. The banks hedge all of its counter-party risks if and only if
payoff from hedging in contagious equilibrium > payoff from not hedging
≡ β
(
1− p
)
B1
> β
(
1− p
)2r!
22r

B1+2ru
0! (2r−0)! +
B1+ (2r−2)u
1! (2r−1)! +
B1+ (2r−4)u
2! (2r−2)! + · · ·+
B1+ (2r−2r)u
2r
2
!
(
2r−
2r
2
)
!

≡ B1 >
2r!
22r

B1+2ru
0! (2r−0)! +
B1+ (2r−2)u
1! (2r−1)! +
B1+ (2r−4)u
2! (2r−2)! + · · ·+
B1+ (2r−2r)u
2r
2
!
(
2r− 2r
2
)
!

≡ B1 >
2ur
r∑
K=0
2r−2K
K! (2r−K)!
22r −
r∑
K=0
2r!
K! (2r−K)!
which satisfies inequality (4), and thus banks hedge all of its counter-party risks.
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Let the returns from the successful project be RH +
| i−r |∑
k= | i−1 |
εk −
| i−2r |∑
k= | i−(r+1) |
εk. Assume
that the bank goes bankrupt at t = 2 if the counter-party realization of its unhedged
risk is −u. This is true if the bank cannot repay its debt at t = 2, i.e.,
RH −u < R⋆ı,0 D
⋆ ≡ RH −u < RH −B1+X ≡ u > B1−X
if a bank fails when it loses −u on its unhedged counter-party exposure, it will fail
when the loss is greater than −u on its unhedged counter-party exposure. ⊓⊔
Corollary 4. If number of counter-party neighbors is 2 (i.e., r = 1), then
B1 >
2u
(
2−0
0! (2−0)! +
2−2
1! (2−1)!
)
22−
(
2!
0! (2−0)! +
2!
1! (2−1)!
) ≡ B1 > 2u and u > B1−X.
Lemma 6. When the number of neighboring counter-parties is less than n/2, a bank
chooses to shirk if one or more of its counter-parties default by leaving the bank
unhedged resulting in its debt not being rolled over at t = 1.
Proof. If a bank borrows Dmax(Rl,0) at t = 0 and if the bank has a low expected
realization of RL, then the debt financing is not rolled over at t = 1. Since RL < L,
the creditors will want to terminate the project. The bank goes bankrupt if its debt
financing is not rolled over at t = 1.
If 2r, the number of counter-party neighbors, is less than n/2, then probability of
failure due to counter-party risk is less than n/2
n
, i.e., the probability of counter-party
risk is less than 1/2. Since we assume that banks will consider a counter party risk
probability of at least 1/2 to insure against counter-party risk, banks do not insure
against counter-party risk using default insurance when 2r < n/2. When 2r ≥ n/2, the
probability of counter-party risk becomes at least 1/2 and hence banks will hedge the
counter-party risk. The counter-party insurance payoff happens with probability 2rp
n
in case of private perspective and with probability (n−1)p
n
in case of social perspec-
tive. Thus, as 2r increases to n−1, the counter-party insurance payoff probability in
private perspective becomes the same as that in social perspective.
When 2r ≥ n/2, the individual banks will hedge the counter-party risk by taking
counter-party insurance. When 2r < n/2, banks will not hedge the counter-party risk
and hence failure of a counter-party will lead to the violation of its incentive con-
straint, thus the bank shirks and the project delivers RL. Let D1 be the amount of
debt to be rolled over at t = 1. The investors will demand higher interest rate Rı,1 in
order to break even. Let Ps be the probability of a bank that do not default, P f be
the probability of a bank that defaults, and nd be the number of neighbors of any
bank that default. Thus, Ps =
2r−nd
2r
and P f =
nd
2r
. By the break even condition of
investors, we get
PsRı,1D1 +P f RL = D1 ≡ Rı,1D1 =
D1 −P f RL
Ps
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The incentive constraint is
β(RH −Rı,1D1 +X) ≥ βB1
≡ β
(
RH −
D1 −P f RL
Ps
+X
)
≥ βB1
≡ PsRH −D1 +P f RL +PsX ≥ B1Ps
≡ PsRH −D1 +P f RL +PsX ≥ B1Ps
≡ Ps
(
RH +X−B1
)
+P f RL ≥ D1
If the bank had originally borrowed D0, the amount it has to roll over at t = 1 is
Rı,0D0 = RH + X − B1, but the amount that is actually getting rolled over is only
Ps(RH +X−B1)+P f RL. ⊓⊔
Corollary 5. If number of counter-party neighbors is 2 (i.e., 2r = 2) and number of
banks defaulted is 1 (i.e., nd = 1), then Ps = 2r−nd2r = 1/2, P f = nd2r = 1/2, and thus
Ps
(
RH +X−B1
)
+P f RL ≥ D1 ≡
1
2
(
RH +X−B1
)
+
1
2
RL ≥ D1
Appendix 1: Remaining Proofs
(I) Proof of Dmax = RH−B1+XRı,0 < 1
The incentive constraint of a bank surviving at t = 1 and holding no risk can be
written as follows:
payoff if bank exerts effort ≥ payoff if bank does not exert effort
≡ β[RH −Rı,0D+X] ≥ βB1 ≡
RH −B1+X
Rı,0
≥ D ≡ Dmax =
RH −B1+X
Rı,0
< 1
︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
since Rı,0 ≥ 1
and, by inequality (3), RH +X−B1 ≤ 1
(II) Proof of ssafe = 1−β
n
−β
p
n
Assume all counter parties are insured. The insurance company has to hold a capital
of 2RI. If all the banks insure against the failure of their counter-parties, the insur-
ance fund breaks even if the price per unit of the default insurance s is determined
by the break even condition. Using the superscript safe to denote the insured system,
we get
Densely Entangled Financial Systems 15(
expected amount that remains in the insurance fund at t = 2
)
=
(
amount that insurance fund has to set aside at t = 0
)
≡ β(2rI−2prI) = 2rI−2nrIs ≡ β(1− p) = 1−ns ≡ ssafe = 1−β
n
−β
p
n
(III) Proof of Dsafe =
(
1− p
n
)
(RH −B1+X)+ pn L
Since the investors break even, we have
(
1− p
n
)
RsafeDsafe +
p
n
L = Dsafe. Combining
with the maximum amount that can be borrowed, we get
Dmax =
RH −B1+X
Rı,0
=⇒ RsafeDsafe = RH −B1+X
which proves our claim.
(IV) Proof of D⋆ = (1− p)(RH −B1+X)+ p L
If all the banks decide not to buy insurance and hold the minimum amount of equity
to roll over debt, the system is contagious. The investors will always anticipate the
equilibrium and break even, implying
(1− p)R⋆ı,0 D⋆+ p L = D⋆ ≡ D⋆ = (1− p)(RH−B1+X)+ p L︸                                       ︷︷                                       ︸
since by (I) R⋆
ı,0 D
⋆ = RH −B1+X
(V) Proof of R⋆
ı,0 =
1
1−p
(
1− LRH−B1+X
)
R⋆ı,0 D
⋆ = RH −B1+X︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
by (I)
≡ R⋆ı,0 =
RH −B1+X
D⋆
≡ R⋆ı,0 =
RH −B1+X
(1− p)(RH−B1+X)+ pL︸                                                                    ︷︷                                                                    ︸
since, by (IV), D⋆ = (1− p)(RH −B1+X)+ p L
≡ R⋆ı,0 =
1
1− p
(
1− LRH−B1+X
)
‘
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(VI) Proof of pterm = (1−β)
(
n
n−1
) ( B0
RH+X−L−B1(1−βB1)+RL+βB1−Ln−1
)
If a bank borrows long term, the banker can borrow up to the point to make him/her
indifferent between long-term borrowing and shirking in both periods to collect
B0+B1. In long-term lending, investors cannot liquidate the bank under any circum-
stances. Since shirking in only the second period is clearly suboptimal, the banker
shirks in both periods and the expected payoff as of t = 0 is B0 + B1, and thus the
payoff in the good state must be at least B0+B1. This implies:(
1− p
n
) (
RH −R termD term+X
)
+
p
n
B1 ≥ B0+B1
Considering the worst case scenario
(
1− p
n
) (
RH −R termD term +X
)
+
p
n
B1 = B0+B1
≡ R termD term = RH +X−
B0+B1−
p
n
B1
1− p
n
(7)
Since the lenders break even in expectation at t = 0, we have
D term =
(
1−
p
n
)
R termD term+
p
n
RL =⇒ D term =
(
1−
p
n
)
(X+RH)−B0−B1+ p
n
B1+
p
n
RL︸                                                          ︷︷                                                          ︸
using (7)
≡ D term = X+RH −
p
n
X−
p
n
RH −B0−B1+
p
n
B1+
p
n
RL
Banks will not decide to deviate from contagious equilibrium provided the following
holds:
payoff in contagious system ≥ payoff in long-term borrowing
≡ β(1− p).B1− (1−D∗) ≥ β(B0+B1)− (1−D term)
≡ βB1− pβB1−1+RH +X−B1− pRH − pX+ pB1+ pL
≥ βB0+βB1−1+X+RH −
p
n
X−
p
n
RH −B0−B1+
p
n
B1+
p
n
RL
≡ B0−βB0 ≥
p
n
(
nβB1+nRH +nX−nB1−nL−X−RH +B1+RL+ L− L+βB1−βB1
)
≡ nB0(1−β) ≥ p(βB1(n−1)+RH(n−1)+X(n−1)−B1(n−1)− L(n−1)+RL+βB1− L)
≡
n
n−1
B0(1−β) ≥ p
(
βB1+RH +X−B1− L+
RL+βB1− L
n−1
)
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≡ p ≤ (1−β)
(
n
n−1
) 
B0
RH +X− L−B1(1−βB1)+ RL +βB1− L
n−1

=⇒ p term = (1−β)
(
n
n−1
) 
B0
RH +X− L−B1(1−βB1)+ RL +βB1− L
n−1

(VII) Proof of p f.aut = (1−β)(RH+X−B1−RL)
RH+X−L−B1(1−β)− βn (RH−RL)
Since a bank survives at t = 2 even if its real project only delivers RL, we have
payoff in contagious system ≥ payoff in full autarky
≡ β(1− p)B1− (1−D⋆) ≥ β
(
1− p
n
)
(RH +X−RL)+β p
n
X−
(
1−RL
)
≡ βB1− pβB1−1+RH +X−B1− pRH − pX+ pB1+ pL ≥
βRH +βX−βRL −
p
n
βRH −
p
n
βX+
p
n
βRL+β
p
n
X−
(
1−RL
)
≡ βB1+RH +X−B1−βX+βRL −RL −βRH ≥ p
(
βB1+RH +X−B1− L−
βRH
n
+
βRL
n
)
≡ RH(1−β)+X(1−β)−B1(1−β)−RL(1−β) ≥ p
(
RH +X− L−B1(1−β)− β
n
(RH −RL)
)
≡ p ≤
(1−β)(RH +X−B1−RL)
RH +X− L−B1(1−β)− β
n
(RH −RL)
≡ p f.aut =
(1−β)(RH +X−B1−RL)
RH +X− L−B1(1−β)− β
n
(RH −RL)
(VIII) Proof of I = ru+X−B1 > 0
The amount of debt reduction needed at time t = 1 to stabilize a bank that lost at
least r counter-parties is I = ru+X− B1 > 0. If less than r counter-party neighbors
fail, then the fraction of failed counter-parties of the bank is less than 1/2, hence bank
can survive this loss. If a bank looses at least r hedges at t = 1, it can only roll over
its debt if its incentive constraint is not violated. This can be insured by injecting
enough equity into the bank to make sure it can pay back its debt even if it loses ru
at t = 2 due to the lost hedge. Thus, we have
RH − ru−Rmaxı,1 D
max + I ≥ 0 ≡ Rmaxı,1 D
max = RH +X−B1 =⇒ I = ru+X−B1
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Appendix 2: Glossary of financial terminologies
Risk: Risk is a chance that an investment’s actual return will be less than ex-
pected.
Asset: An asset is anything that is owned by an individual or business that has a
monetary value.
Counter-party Risk: Risk that one party in an agreement defaults on its obliga-
tion to repay or return securities.
Hedging: A strategy to reduce the risk by making a transaction in one market to
protect against the loss in another market.
Over The Counter (OTC): A market that is conducted between dealers by tele-
phone and computer and not on a listed exchange. OTC stocks tend to be of those
companies that do not meet the listing requirements of an exchange, although
some companies that do meet the listing requirements choose to remain as OTC
stocks. The deals and instruments are generally not standardized and there is no
public record of the price associated with any transaction.
Equity: The amount that shareholders own, in the form of common or preferred
stock, in a publicly quoted company. Equity is the risk-bearing part of the com-
pany’s capital and contrasts with debt capital which is usually secured in some
way and which has priority over shareholders if the company becomes insolvent
and its assets are distributed.
Liquidity: The degree to which an asset or security can be bought or sold in the
market without affecting the asset’s price, i.e., the ability to convert an asset to
cash quickly.
Credit Default Swap (CDS): A specific type of counter-party agreement that al-
lows the transfer of third party credit risk from one party to the other. One party
in the swap is a lender and faces a credit risk from a third party, and the counter-
party in the swap agrees to insure this risk in exchange for regular periodic pay-
ments.
Appendix 3: List of notations and variables
n : total number of banks in the network.
t : the time variable. Three time periods t = 0,1,2 are considered (initial, interim
and final time period, respectively).
β : the discount factor (we assume that β < 1).
R : the borrowing rate. R0 and R1 are the borrowing rates at t = 0 and at t = 1,
respectively.
ε : an independent random variable, realized at t = 2, that takes a value of +u or
−u, each with probability 1/2.
Densely Entangled Financial Systems 19
L : the return if the investments are liquidated early at t = 1 L(< RH).
X : Non-pledgable payoff.
r : each bank is assumed to have 2r counter-party neighbors.
D : investors share of investment in the bank at t = 0; 1−D is the bankers share
of investment in the bank at t = 0 (D,1−D ≥ 1).
e : the unobservable effort choice made by the bank (e ∈ {0,1}).
Bi : Bankers private benefit at the time period i.
p : the probability of bad state.
psoc : if p < psoc, then irrespective of the number of counter-party neighbors there
is no need for any counter-party insurance even from a social perspective.
pind : if p > pind then the banks will not buy any counter-party insurance as the
private benefits of insuring exceed the cost.
pterm : if p < pterm then the banks will continue to prefer short-term debt.
paut : if p < paut then no bank will have an incentive to hold more equity and bor-
row less. paut is equal to min
{
ps.aut, pr.aut, pf.aut
}
where the superscripts s.aut,
r.aut and f.aut stand for safe autarky, risky autarky and full autarky, respectively.
Dmax : The maximum amount of borrowing at t = 0 that can be rolled over at t = 1.
ssafe : The price per unit of default insurance in a stable system where all banks
buy counter-party insurance.
Dsafe : The amount borrowed by the bank for unit investment in the project in a
stable system where all banks buy counter-party insurance.
D⋆ : The amount borrowed by the bank for unit investment in the project in a
contagious system where banks decide not to buy insurance.
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